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STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW: STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND
OF REPOSE
INTRODUCTION
Should manufacturers escape liability for personal injury after their
products have been on the market for a certain length of time? In light
of the recent product liability explosion, this is a pressing question for
critics of existing product liability statutes. Statutes of limitation and of
repose are statutory creations. Little needs to be said about statutes of
limitation because they are universally accepted as necessary and fair. On
the other hand, statutes of repose, which have become increasingly popular
in recent years, often are criticized and questioned. It remains to be seen
whether statutes of repose will weather the storm they have created.
This section will examine the policy bases for the existence of statutes
of limitation and statutes of repose. After a brief discussion of why
statutes of limitation are so widely accepted, the section will focus on
how some states have enacted statutes of repose to supplement statutes
of limitation. The section will detail the successes and failures of state
statutes of repose and examine the merits of a national statute of repose.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION: THE STARTING POINT
Statutes of limitation have been in existence since the enactment of
the Roman Code.' Because they focus upon the conduct of the plaintiff
rather than the essence of the claim, statutes of limitation are considered
procedural, rather than substantive. 2 Statutes of limitation encourage
plaintiffs to speedily bring actions before the court, and they deny
plaintiffs the power to enforce stale claims.
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent a public policy about the privilege
to litigate.' Their length, however, always has been assigned arbitrarily,
4
without regard to the merit of potential claims.
Three general categories of statutes of limitation exist in product
liability legislation. 5 First, there are statutes that combine a long outside
period of limitation that runs from the time of manufacture or sale, with
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1177 (1950).
See United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d 639, 642 (2nd Cir. 1945).
"[Statutes of limitation] are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate
between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable or unavoidable delay. They have come
into the law not through the judicial process but through legislation." Chase Securities Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
See Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitations-A New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 177
INs. L.J. 535, 537 (1977).
See P. SIIRMAsN, PRODUCTS LiABILrTY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 160 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
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a shorter period that runs from the date of injury. 6 A second category
establishes a single period of limitations, which runs from the date of
sale. 7 The final category begins to run at the time of injury' but also
creates a maximum period of liability by establishing a rebuttable presumption against defectiveness after the ordinary useful life of the product. 9

THE PARALLEL POLICY OF STATUTES OF REPOSE
Statutes of respose are also rooted in public policy. In response to
complaints by manufacturers and their insurers about the growing number
of product liability suits, many state legislatures have enacted statutes of
repose. The statutes operate to procedurally cut off a plaintiff's product
liability action at a specified time after the product has left the possession
of the seller or manufacturer.
There are at least five definitions of "statute of repose." 0 The first
definition does not distinguish between a statute of repose and a statute
of limitation." The second definition treats the statute of repose as a
general category that encompasses various statutes, including a statute of
limitation. 12 The third definition states that a statute of repose is a type
of statute of limitation. 3 The fourth definition indicates that a statute of
repose is separate and distinct from a statute of limitation because it4
begins to run at a time unrelated to the accrual of the cause of action.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire and Tennessee
have enacted this type of statute of limitation. See infra note 16.
North Carolina, North Dakota and Rhode Island have enacted this type of statute of limitation.
See infra note 16.
Arkansas and Colorado have enacted this type of statute of limitation. See infra note 16.
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan and Minnesota have enacted this type of statute of limitation.
See infra note 16.
See generally McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes
of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579, 582-87 (1981).
Professor McGovern indicated that older treatise writers and judges often used "repose" and
"limitation" interchangeably. See, e.g., Gorman v. Judge of Newaygo Circuit Court, 27 Mich.
138, 141 (1873). In fact, most modern courts do not use the term "statute of repose" consisterrtly.
"A statute of repose is an act that promotes a policy of finality in legal relationships, and it
can include any number of statutory devices that accomplish this purpose." McGovern, supra
note 10, at 583, citing Rosenberg v. Town of New Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 201, 293 A.2d 662,
667 (1972).
"This definition suggests that a statute of repose is the portion of a statute of limitation that
places a cap or outer limit on a statute that begins to run when a party discovers the existence
of an injury or cause of action." McGovern, supra note 10, at 583.
See id. at 584. As Professor Martin has stated:
The simplest form of a statute of repose would typically provide that "no cause of
action may be brought against the seller of a defective product for injuries occurring
more than ten years after the seller sold the product." Such a statute is distinguishable
from a "statute of limitation" which ordinarily begins to run when there has been a
breach of the obligation. The statute of limitation thus puts a time limit on the plaintiff's
right to seek a remedy for a breach. The statute of repose, on the other hand, limits
the obligation itself.
Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L. RaV. 745, 749 (1982).
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The final definition views a statute of repose as establishing an affirmative
5
defense for the manufacturer or seller.1
To date, at least twenty-three states 6 have enacted product liability
statutes of repose in one form or another 7 in response to the chaos in
the area of product liability during recent years. In turn, many state

15.

See McGovern, supra note 10, at 584. This definition is most often found in the "useful life"
provision of product liability statutes, which indicates that a defendant may be relieved of any
liability by proving that the product was used beyond its useful life.
16. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1986) (within 10 years after the product is first used); Auiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (Supp. 1986) (within 12 years after the product was first sold for
use or consumption, unless the cause of action is based upon the negligence of the manufacturer
or seller or a breach of an express warranty provided by the manufacturer or seller); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2804 (Supp. 1985) (use of a product beyond its anticipated life by a consumer
where the consumer knew or should have known the anticipated life of the product may be
considered as evidence of fault on the part of the consumer); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3)
(Supp. 1986) (10 years after a product is first sold for use or consumption, it shall be rebuttably
presumed that the product was not defective); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(a) (West Supp.
1986) (within 10 years from the date that the party last parted with possession or control of the
product); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West 1982) (within 12 years after the date of delivery
of the completed product to its original purchaser); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (1984)
(within 10 years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property
causing or otherwise bringing about the injury); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403 (Supp. 1986) (after 10
years, presumption arises that the harm was caused after the useful life has expired); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (within 12 years from the date of the first sale,
lease or delivery of possession by a seller or 10 years from the date of first sale, lease or
delivery of possession to its initial user or consumer); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West Supp.
1986) (within 10 years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-33-3 (1983) (seller shall not be liable if harm was caused after the product's
useful life; after 10 years a rebuttable presumption arises that it occurred beyond the useful
life); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Supp. 1981) (rebuttable presumption that product was
not defective if more than five years after date of sale to first consumer or more than eight
years after date of manufacture); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(a) (West Supp. 1986) (if
product has been in use less than 10 years, the plaintiff, in proving prima facie case, shall be
required to do so without benefit of any presumption); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West Supp.
1986) (it is a defense that injury was sustained after the expiration of the ordinary useful life
of the product); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (1985) (within 10 years after the date the product
was first sold or leased for use or consumption); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1986)
(within 12 years after the manufacturer of the product parted with its possession and control
or sold it, whichever occurred last); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-5-0(6) (Supp. 1983) (within six years
after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp.
1985) (within 10 years of the date of initial purchase for use or consumption or within 11 years
of the date of manufacture); OR. REv. STAT. § 30-905(1) (Supp. 1986) (within eight years after
the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
9-1-13 (1985) (within 10 years after the date the product was first purchased for use or
consumption); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1986) (within 10 years from the date on which
the product was first purchased for use or consumption, or within one year after the expiration
of the anticipated life of the product); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977) (within six years after
date of initial purchase for use or consumption or 10 years after the date of manufacture); and
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1987) (a seller is not subject to liability if seller
proves that harm was caused after product's useful life has expired; if harm was caused within
12 years after the time of delivery, rebuttable presumption that the harm was caused after the
useful life had expired).
17. Statutes of repose exist in other areas of the law besides product liability, such as medical
malpractice and architect and contractor liability. See Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980s:
Repose is Not the Destiny of Man, 61 N.C.L. REv. 33, 43 (1982).
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judiciaries responded to the clamor of consumerists and declared these
statutes void.' 8
Arguments in Favor of Statutes of Repose
Statutes of repose have strong appeal to industry because they eliminate the long-tail 19 or open-ended 20 liability problems associated with older
products. Allowing a plaintiff to initiate a product liability action indefinitely after the product is introduced into the market subjects the manufacturer and the seller to potential liability for the entire life of the
product. This long-tail liability makes it difficult for sellers and manufacturers to adjust risk and set realistic product prices. 2' The resulting lack
of statistical forseeability is reflected in insurance premiums. 22 The imposition of a statute of repose limits a manufacturer's liability, provides
certainty to manufacturers 23and insurance companies, and ultimately reduces insurance premiums.

This leads to a second argument in favor of statutes of repose. The
risk of liability for a defective product without a statute of repose is
much greater for some groups of manufacturers than others. For example,
manufacturers who produce capital goods, such as large machines, are at
a distinct competitive disadvantage compared with those who do not.
Because they sell few items in comparison with other manufacturers,
capital goods manufacturers are less able to absorb the risk of liability
within the price of their products. 24 Similarly, older manufacturers are at
a disadvantage compared with manufacturers just entering the market
18.
19.

20.

21.

22.

23.
24.

See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
Long-tail liability describes the situation in which a manufacturer of a defective product is liable
many years after the product left its hands. The concept derives its name from the shape of the
graph drawn with claims paid on one axis and years from manufacture on the other. A statute
1
of repose is enacted to cut off the tail. See Martin, supra note 14, at 746.
Another term for long-tail liability is open-ended liability. See Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985) (statute of repose did not violate open courts provision
of state constitution because the effect was merely to bar claims within a certain period after
product's manufacture in order to shield the manufacturer from open-ended liability, which
runs anew with each subsequent purchase, creating unending liability).
"[Without statutes of repose] it may be difficult to "cost in" tort liability over a period of ten,
twenty, thirty or more years, given the uncertainties of future economic developments with their
effects on damages, to say nothing of the uncertainties of the legal standards that will be
applied." Martin, supra note 14, at 747, citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABIaiTy, FINAL REPORT VII-22, 1-28 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE FiNAL REPORT].
"Insofar as resource allocation is concerned, [losses generated from product liability lawsuits]
are just as truly costs of producing particular goods as are more favorable risks. Lack of
foreseeability makes it somewhat more difficult to include these costs in the price of the item
produced." McGovern, supra note 10, at 593. Because most businesses choose to insure
themselves against these losses, this lack of foreseeability reflects itself in higher insurance
premiums. See id.; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 529 (1961).
See Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 I11.App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522, 523 (1981).
See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at VII-22, cited in Martin, supra
note 14, at 748.
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because they face liability exposure from products already sold. 25
Another argument in favor of statutes of repose involves the procedural aspect of defending product liability lawsuits. There are substantial
and unique problems associated with defending a suit based on a thirty-

year-old product. Investigation, 26 admissibility of evidence, 27 availability
of witnesses and defenses, 28 and high transaction costs 29 are among the

many difficulties.
Statutes of repose also promote judicial economy by eliminating a
particular group of cases from an already crowded judicial docket.30 In
essence, proponents of statutes of repose are asking legislatures to define
the scope of compensable harm and to balance the inherent unfairness to
defendant manufacturers and sellers.
Arguments Against Statutes of Repose
Most of the arguments against statutes of repose center on inflexibility
and lack of uniformity. One of the more popular allegations is the inequity
created when statutes of repose are enacted on a state-by-state basis.33' 2
Residents of a state with a "date of discovery" statute of limitations
are at a distinct advantage compared with residents of a state with a
statute of repose that bars suit after a certain number of years. In addition,
opponents argue that state-by-state enactment of statutes of repose would
not reduce insurance rates because rates are set on a national scale and
scarcely take the 'reduced risk of liability in any given jurisdiction into
account .
Inequality exists not only between states but also between products.
Because the useful life of different products varies, opponents argue that
a uniform wearing-out time set without regard to useful life would be
unfair.Y
The most powerful argument against statutes of repose involves the
question of constitutionality. Some courts have found statutes of repose
25.

See generally Hicks, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND.
L. RFv. 627 (1985).
26. See Martin, supra note 14, at 748.
27. See Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53, 56 (1974) (two reasons generally
advanced for imposition of a statute of repose are (1) the reliability and availability of evidence
and (2) the prevention of the burden of protracted or unknown potential liability).
28. See Martin, supra note 14, at 748.
29. See McGovern, supra note 10, at 594 ("the litigation expenses that the manufacturer would
otherwise incur in defending action involving older products would be calculated in the societal
savings generated by [a statute of repose]").
30. See id.
31. See McGovern, supra note 10, at 595; Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products
Liability Statutes of Limitation, 56 N.C.L. REv. 663, 672 (1978).
32. Jurisdictions with "date of discovery" statutes of limitation, in this instance, do not have
statutes of repose. Instead of cutting off liability after eight years from the date of manufacture
of the product, these states cut off liability within a specified time from discovery. Therefore,
the time within which a plaintiff must bring a suit varies from situation to situation.
33. See McGovern, supra note 10, at 595.
34. See Phillips, supra note 31, at 673.
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deny product liability claimants their day in court, notwithstanding the
merits of their claims and the direct liability of potential defendants.3" At
least thirteen states 6 have ruled on the constitutionality of state statutes
of repose. Of these, six states have upheld the statutes,3 7 and seven states
have declared them unconstitutional. 38 The majority of the constitutional
challenges have been made on the basis of equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment, 3 9 due process of law under state and federal
constitutions,4° and violations of state "open-court" provisions, which
41
guarantee equal access to courts.
35.

See Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (the effect of this
absolute limitation on suits against the manufacturer is to nullify some causes of action before
they arise); Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) (statute of
repose found unconstitutional because it denied court access to a class of plaintiffs merely
because they were injured by a product more than 10 years old).
36. Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee and Utah. See infra notes 37-38.
37. See, e.g., Daily v. New Britain Mach. Co., 200 Conn. 562, 512 A.2d 893 (1986) (statute of
repose does not violate the state or federal constitutions); Costello v. Unarco Industries, Inc.,
129 Ill. App. 3d 736, 473 N.E.2d 96 (1984) (product liability statute of repose does not violate
special legislation and certain remedy provisions of the Illinois Constitution, nor does it violate
due process or equal protection requirements of the Illinois and federal constitutions); Dague v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. 1984) (the Indiana product liability act, which
encompasses a 10-year statute of repose, does not contravene the provision of the state
constitution guaranteeing access to open court); Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332
S.E.2d 67 (1985) (product liability six-year statute of repose did not violate equal protection or
the open courts provision of the state constitution); Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541,
674 P.2d 1194 (1984) (eight-year product liability statute of repose did not violate the state
constitutional guarantee of access to the courts or equal protection); Buckner v. GAF Corp.,
495 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (product liability statute of repose did not violate due
process).
38. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long, & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982) (10-year product
liability statute of repose was unconstitutional as violative of the Alabama constitutional provision
requiring that all courts be open); Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671
(Fla. 1981) (where product liability action against manufacturer of drug was barred before it
ever existed in that it was not discovered until 20 years after the drug was administered, and
the 12-year statute of repose, as applied, violated state constitution's guarantee of access to
courts); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983) (12-year statute of repose
was unconstitutional); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986) (10-year
product liability statute of repose violates the equal protection clause of the state constitution);
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) (10-year statute of repose
was unconstitutional because it denied court access to product liability claimants injured by
products more than 10 years old); Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op Bldg. Supply Ass'n., 349 N.W.2d
419 (S.D. 1984) (six-year product liability statute of repose was unconstitutional as violative of,
and repugnant to, constitutional provisions insuring the citizenry of open courts); Berry v. Beech
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (product liability statute of repose operating to bar actions
without regard to when an injury occurs found unconstitutional as violative of open courts
provision).
39. See Hicks, supra note 25, at 635-42. The appropriate standard to apply with an equal protection
claim in this context is the rational basis test. Under that test, the statute will be upheld if it is
a rational means of achieving a proper legislative purpose. Statutes of limitation generally have
withstood the rational basis test, because the purpose of the statute is to limit the number of
claims and set a finite period during which a defendant may be liable. See Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965); Purk v. Federal Press Co., 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980) (court
rejected a contention that the statute of repose denied equal protection by establishing a
classification that had no rational relation to a proper state objective).
40. See Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207 (1981). The court held that
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APPROACHES TO STATUTES OF REPOSE
When drafting a statute of repose, state legislators list the scope,
start of the period of repose, end of the period of repose and consequences
of the running of the period as the most important considerations. 42 With
regard to the scope of the statute, state approaches vary sharply. Some
states exclude express warranties 43 or all warranties" from their statutes
of repose, some states apply statutes of repose only to strict liability
actions, 45 and still other states make the statutes of repose inapplicable in
cases where fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure is
alleged. 46 Also included in the concept of scope are the potential defendants. Each statute defines the class of defendants differently, 47 some more
broadly than others.
Two types of statutes of repose dominate the state arena with regard
' 48
to the start of the period of repose: "date of sale" and "useful life.
In states that use the "date of sale" approach, 49 consumers are protected
against products that remain with the manufacturer or seller for extended
periods of time. Variations of this starting period run from the date of
manufacture,50 the first purchase of the product for use or consumption,"'
52
the date the party last parted with possession or control of the product,
or the date of delivery."

41.

42.
43.

statute of repose was not sufficiently arbitrary or unreasonable as to be constitutionally
impermissible under the due process clause. Id. at 214. See also Annot., Validity and Construction
of Statutes Terminating Right of Action for Product Caused Injury at Fixed Period After
Manufacture, Sale or Delivery, 25 A.L.R.4th 641, 651 (1983).
See Hicks, supra note 25, at 644-48. Many states have open-court provisions that state, for
example, that "all courts shall be open; and that every person, for any injury done him ...
shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial, or delay." See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10; FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 21.
Jurisdictions have held that the open-court provision is analogous to the due process clause
of the United States Constitution, and it prevents state legislatures from abolishing a common
law cause of action. See, e.g., Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985);
Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981); Overland Constr. v. Sirmons, 369
So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); and Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1976).
See Martin, supra note 14, at 762, citing Address by William McGovern, ABA Convention
(Honolulu, Aug. 5, 1980).
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(a) (West Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5
(West Supp. 1986).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West Supp. 1986).
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (1984).
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(a) (West Supp. 1986).
New Hampshire addresses claims against a person having a legal duty to maintain or repair the
product. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2(I1)(b) (Supp. 1986). Illinois, by contrast, defines
"seller" very broadly. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
See Martin, supra note 14, at 767-68.
E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah and Washington.
E.g., Kentucky, North Dakota, Tennessee and Utah.
E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Utah.
E.g., Connecticut and New Hampshire.
E.g., Florida and Indiana.
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The "useful life" approach deals primarily with the end of the
limitation period and avoids some of the inflexibility of the "date of
sale" approach. 4 Under the "useful life" approach, the statute relieves
a defendant of liability when the defendant proves an allegedly defective
product was used beyond its useful life."
The consequences of the running of the period differ depending on
whether the "useful life" or "date of sale" approach is used. In jurisdictions using the "useful life" approach, the expiration of the useful or
anticipated product life or the statutory period creates a rebuttable presumption that the product was not defective. Most "date of sale" statutes
bar any recovery for a defective product after the period ends.
The effects of statutes of repose are permanent. They shift the risk
of loss from the manufacturer or seller to the consumer. They also shift
the responsibility of deciding whether to allow compensation from the
judiciary to the legislature.
The Future
Professor Dworkin has suggested several alternatives to courts faced
with justifiable claims for relief after the expiration of the statute of
repose. 6 These options include distinguishing between delayed-manifestation and delayed-injury suits, 5 7 tolling the period and declaring the repose

statute unconstitutional.18 Dworkin maintains that the advantage of the
first two options is that delayed-manifestation suits may be prosecuted
without directly upsetting legislative judgment in an area where wide
discretion traditionally has been allowed.5 9 In addition, some commenta0
tors have proposed that Congress pass a uniform statute of repose.
Proponents of such legislation contend that it would provide an accurate
basis for insurance rates, would facilitate the flow of interstate commerce
54. E.g., Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Tennessee and Washington.
55. Under the common standard, useful life is a concept by which the claimant may obtain an
extension of the repose period. For instance, the plaintiff could prove that the product seller
gave instructions about the useful life that indicate it is longer than the typical state statute of
repose. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577 (West Supp. 1986).
56. In Connecticut and Minnesota, the determination of whether the product's useful life has expired
includes consideration of such factors as the effect on the product of wear and tear or
deterioration from natural causes; the policy of the user and similar users on repairs, renewals
and replacements; the effect of climatic and other local conditions in which the product was
used; representations, instructions and warnings the product seller gave about the useful life of
the product; and any modification or alteration of the product by a user or third party. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577(a) (West Supp. 1986); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West Supp.
1986).
57. This solution focuses on the long-tail problem discussed in supra note 19 and accompanying
text. There are inequities involved in bringing an old-product injury suit where the product at
issue is 10, 20 or even 30 years old. But inequities also exist when there is a delayed manifestation
of an injury and the plaintiff is not allowed to bring suit. Legislatures should distinguish between
the two types of suits.
58. See Dworkin, supra note 17, at 45.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 25, at 653.
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and would allow manufacturers
to successfully base marketing decisions
61
on economic principles.
CONCLUSION
Product liability statutes of repose continue to be severely criticized
for their harshness and inflexibility, and some plaintiffs have successfully
challenged their constitutionality. It appears that the trend is against state
statutes of repose. Courts are increasingly realizing that harsh results are
caused by these statutes, and they are remedying the situation by declaring
them unconstitutional. When deciding whether to institute a state statute
of repose, legislators should keep in mind the statute's inflexibility, lack
of uniformity and potential unfairness. Legislators may also wish to
consider the high probability that a federal statute of repose for product
liability claims will be implemented in the near future. A federal limitation
period would alleviate the lack of uniformity that exists between plaintiffs
and products. Legislators should work toward this national standard
because a federal statute of repose would stand the best chance of
weathering the storm created by inconsistency among the states.
Lori A. Merlo*

61.

See id. at 633.
B.A., Canisius College, 1985; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1988.

